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Abstract—The two dependability means considered in this
paper are rigorous design and fault tolerance. It can be complex
to rigorously design some classes of systems, including fault
tolerant ones, therefore appropriate abstractions are needed to
better support system modelling and analysis. The abstraction
proposed in this paper for this purpose is the notion of operation
mode. Modes are formalised and their relation to a state-based
formalism in a refinement approach is established. The use
of modes for fault tolerant systems is then discussed and a
case study presented. Using modes in state-based modelling
allows us to improve system structuring, the elicitation of system
assumptions and expected functionality, as well as requirement
traceability.
Keywords-operation modes; fault-tolerance; formal specifica-
tion; Event-B.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems are dependable if they deliver service that can be
justifiably trusted [1]. Building such systems is a challenging
task, typically conducted by employing various dependability
means. In this paper we are particularly interested in the
means of two types: rigorous design and fault tolerance.
Rigorous design (or fault prevention) is often used to
justify system trustworthiness by preventing introduction of
faults into system. This can be done by employing formal
modelling and analysis. The known problem with this ap-
proach is its scalability. A way to improve it is through the
development of abstractions and formal techniques tailored
to classes of systems.
System dependability cannot be achieved by only trying
to build perfect systems, any critical system has to face
abnormal situations (including malfunctioning devices, wear-
ing hardware and software defects) and deal with them
properly. This is achieved by integrating appropriate fault
tolerance means into the system. Unfortunately the situation
is not satisfactory here: as reported by F. Cristian [2], field
experience with telephone switching systems showed that
up to two thirds of system failures were due to design
faults in exception handling or recovery algorithms. Other
evidences of inadequate use or construction of fault-tolerance
mechanisms are reported in [3].
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Several authors have investigated fault-tolerance modelling
using different specification formalisms and verification ap-
proaches (e.g. [4], [5]). However, the identification and
support of suitable abstractions for formal design of fault
tolerant systems is still an open issue. Such abstractions have
to, at the one side, be amenable to representation using a
formal specification language, and, on the other side, offer the
way to model and reason about (i) states: the characterization
of normal and erroneous states is inherent to fault tolerant
systems; (ii) structure: separation of normal and abnormal
(fault tolerant) behaviour is to be supported, as well as the
representation of control structures for different tolerance
mechanisms; and (iii) system properties: the statement of sys-
tem properties under different working conditions (addressing
fault assumptions) should be supported.
In this paper the concept of ‘operation mode’ [6] is revi-
sited. We use modes to structure system specification to
facilitate rigorous design and to integrate fault tolerance.
Since modes appear in different types of systems, such as
real-time [6], avionic and space [7], [8], the approach is
useful for building wide classes of dependable systems.
We use term mode in the same sense as [6]: both as
partitions of the state space, representing different working
conditions of the system, and as a way to define control in-
formation, structuring system operation. In Section II, modes
are defined to allow the modeller to state the property that
must be respected, called guarantee, in each working system
condition, called assumption. In Section III, mode refinement
is discussed, allowing detalisation of the mode system. The
use of modes together with a state-based formal method is
discussed in Section V. Mode refinement is performed hand
in hand with the refinement of the respective formal model
and allow layered definition and reasoning about properties.
This helps to trace properties to requirements. Refinement
also offers a strategy to obtain a correct implementation
from the formal model. Theorem proving strategies and tools
sometimes offer an attractive option to model-checking as
they avoid the state-space problem. Section IV discusses
the use of modes in the design of fault-tolerant systems.
Section VI exemplifies the ideas with the model of a cruise
control system. Related work and conclusions are presented
in Sections VII and VIII.
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II. OPERATION MODES
Operation modes help to reason about system behaviour by
focusing on the system properties observed under different
situations. In this approach, a system is seen as a set of
modes partitioning the system functionality over differing
operating conditions. The term assumption is used to denote
the different operating conditions and guarantee denotes the
functionality ensured by the system under the corresponding
assumption. A system may switch from one mode to another
in a number of ways characterised by mode transition.
A mode is thus a pair A/G where A(v) is an assumption,
a predicate over the current system state, G(v, v′) is the
guarantee, a relation over the current and next states of the
system. Vector v is the set of variables, characterising a sys-
tem state and constrained by an invariant I(v). The purpose
of an invariant I(v) is to limit the possible states by excluding
undesirable or unsafe states. It also defines types for variables
v. To limit the scope of discussion, it is assumed that a system
is only in one mode at a time. Mode overlapping and mode
interference bring a number of interesting challenges that
cannot be sufficiently addressed in this paper due to space
limitations. Formally, it is required that mode assumptions
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive in respect to a model
invariant, as below. ⊕ is a set partitioning operator.
I(v) = A1(v)⊕ · · · ⊕An(v) (1)
Mode switching is realised with mode transitions. A mode
transition is an atomic step switching system from one source
to one destination mode. It is convenient to characterise a
mode transition by a pair of assumptions - the assumptions
of source and of destination modes. Assuming that mode is
assigned an index, a mode transition from Ai/Gi to Aj/Gj is
a relation on mode indices i j. A system starts executing
one of initiating transitions   k. The transition switches
the system on and places it into some system mode Ak/Gk. A
system terminates by executing one of terminating transitions
t  ⊥ 1. Mode transitions i   and ⊥  j are not
allowed. Also, it is required that during its lifetime a system
enters at least in one operation mode and thus transition 
⊥ is not possible. There can be any number of initiating and
terminating mode transitions.
There are restrictions on the way mode assumptions and
guarantees are formulated. The states described by a guaran-
tee must be wholly included into valid model states:
I(v) ∧A(v) ∧G(v, v′)⇒ I(v′) (2)
The assumption and guarantee of a mode must be non-
contradictory. I.e. a mode should permit a concrete imple-
mentation:
∃v, v′ · (I(v) ∧A(v)⇒ G(v, v′)) (3)
1Not every system has to have this transition: a control system would be
typically designed as never aborting.
A system is characterised by a collection of modes and a
vector of mode transitions:
A1/G1, . . . An/Gn
i j, . . . k l (4)
The state of a system described using operation modes is
a tuple (m, v) where m is the index of a current operation
mode and v is the current system state. Mode index helps
to clarify how mode switching is done although it may be
computed from v alone due to condition 1. The evolution of
a system like above is understood as follows. While it is in
some mode m the state of model variables evolves so that
the next state is any state v′ satisfying both the corresponding
guarantee G(v, v′) and the modes assumption A(v′):
internal Am(v) ∧Gm(v, v
′) ∧Am(v′)
〈m, v〉 → 〈m, v′〉
If there is a mode transition originating from a current
mode, the transition could be enabled to switch the system
to a new mode.
switching m n ∧Am(v) ∧An(v
′)
〈m, v〉 → 〈n, v′〉
These two activities compete with each other: at each step
a non-deterministic choice is made between the two. An
initiating transition is a special case: it must find an initial
system state without being able to refer to any previous state:
start
	 k ∧Ak(v)
〈	, undef〉 → 〈k, v〉
where undef denotes a system state prior to the execution
of an initiating transition. System termination is addressed
by the switching rule above. Note that all of the three rules
also assume that an invariant holds in current and new states:
I(v) ∧ I(v′). This is a corrolary of conditions 1 and 2.
III. MODE REFINEMENT
Refinement is formal technique for transitioning from an
abstract model to a concrete one [9]. Terms abstract and
concrete are relative here: a concrete model of one step
is another’s step abstract model. There are a number of
benefits in apply refinement in model construction: it combats
complexity by splitting design process into a number of
simple steps; it helps to organise the process of modelling
by allowing a modeller to focus on one aspect of a model a
time; it makes proofs easier as for each refinement one only
has to proof the correctness of new behaviour2. Refinement
is a partial order relation on model universe. This relation is
denoted as  and it is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
For the operation modes mechanism the refinement technique
is used to gradually evolve a system description by adding
or replacing modes and transitions. Such evolution is formal
in a sense that a refined model may be used in place of its
abstraction. A number of refinement techniques can be used.
2Strictly speaking, this only applies to cases when refinement is mono-
tonic. However, all the popular formal methods enjoy this property and
heavily rely on it.
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Data Refinement: With data refinement, data types are
changed and data structures are introduced. The vector of
model variables v is changed to some new vector u and
model invariant I(v) is replaced with new invariant J(v, u),
often called a gluing invariant. The use of variables v in new
invariant J allows modeller to expresses a linking relation
between the state of concrete and abstract models.
Behavioural Refinement: Behaviour refinement details
the mode view on a system. System behaviour becomes more
deterministic and also described in a finer level of details.
One case is changing a mode assumption or guarantee or
both. It is postulated mode assumption cannot be strength-
ened during refinement. This is based on understanding that
an assumption is a requirement of a mode to its environment.
As a system developer cannot assume control over the
environment of a modelled system, a stronger requirement
to an environment may not be realisable. On the other hand,
a weaker requirement to an environment means that a system
is more robust as it would remain operational in a wider range
of environments. Symmetrically, a mode guarantee cannot be
weakened as it is understood as a contract of a mode with
the rest of a system and its environment. Weakening a mode
guarantee could violate expectations of another system part.
The following condition summarises this refinement rule:
A(v)/G(v, v′) 
 A′(u)/G′(u, u′),
iff
 
I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A′(u)
J(v, u) ∧G′(u, u′)⇒ G(v, v′)
(5)
Another case is when an abstract mode is a modelling
abstraction for several concrete modes. Thus, a single mode
in an abstract model evolves into a two or more concrete
modes. The general rule for such refinement step is that
the combination of new modes must be a refinement of
an abstract mode. In more concrete terms, a disjunction of
concrete mode assumptions must be not stronger than the
abstract mode assumption and the disjunction of concrete
guarantee must be not weaker than the abstract guarantee:
A(v)/G(v, v′) 
 A1(u)/G1(u, u
′)
A2(u)/G2(u, u′)
,
iff
 
I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A1(u) ∨A2(u)
I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧G1(u, u′) ∨G2(u, u′)⇒ G(v, v′)
(6)
Superposition Refinement: Sometimes it is needed to
add new modes without splitting an existing abstract mode.
Through superposition refinement it is possible to refine an
implicit skip mode false/true. This is the weakest form of
a mode and it can be refined into any other mode.
Refinement of Transitions: A refinement of a mode or
an introduction of a new mode requires changes to mode
transitions. The general rule is that a transition present in
an abstract model must have a corresponding transition in a
refined model and no new transitions may appear. Changing
mode assumptions and guarantees does not affect mode
transitions. Splitting a mode into sub-modes, however, leads
to the distribution of the mode transitions associated with the
refined mode among the new modes. Thus, if a mode with a
transition is split into two new modes, the transition can be
associated with any one of the new modes or both.
Visual Notation: To assist in application of the ap-
proach, a visual notation loosely based on Modechards [6]
is proposed. A mode is represented by a box with name;
a mode transition is an arrow connecting the previous and
next modes. Special modes  and ⊥ are omitted so that
initiating and terminating transitions appear to be connected
with a single mode. Refinement is expressed by nesting
boxes. Figure 2 exemplifies this. A transition from an abstract
mode is equivalent to having transitions from each of the
concrete modes, e.g. transition ccOff from abstract mode
Cruise Control in diagram (C) of Figure 2.
IV. MODES FOR FAULT TOLERANT SYSTEMS
The use of modes together with a refinement approach, as
introduced in the previous sections, offers suitable abstrac-
tions to modelling and reasoning about fault tolerant systems,
as discussed in the following. Due to the use of a state-based
approach, state representation, manipulation and reasoning
becomes natural. The support provided by modes allows to
partition the state space into normal and erroneous: mode as-
sumptions allow this separation to be declared and erroneous
states made explicit. Refinement allows further definition of
erroneous states into more specific ones. Assumptions on
normal and erroneous states can be suitably associated to
modes in charge of performing normal system operation and
fault tolerance measures, respectively.
In general, a recovery mode should be associated with
a particular normal mode, which it recovers, and mode
switching is in some sense reminiscent to calling an excep-
tion handler in programming languages. Error detection is
immediate, embedded in the erroneous state assumption of
a recovery mode. As soon as a state transition leads to the
characterization of an erroneous state, the recovery mode is
enabled. A more concrete view is to consider the existence
of a detection mechanism, which is active during normal
operation. In such case the detection mechanism affects the
state used in the assumptions of normal and recovery modes.
By refinement one could start with the first and reach the
second, more detailed model. Any of the possibilities allow
switching to recovery mode from any normal mode state.
For reasoning purposes, one can introduce the possibility of
fault occurrences in parallel with the model. In an event based
formalism this takes the form of an enabled event that affects
the state to satisfy the erroneous state assumption.
The recovery mode has access to the state of the respec-
tive normal mode. Analogously to assumptions, guarantees
associated to normal or recovery modes assist to define
properties of the system in absence or presence of errors,
respectively. Depending on the severity of the detected error,
the mode system may assert that the recovery procedure:
(i) successfully recovers the state and thus switches back to
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normal mode to proceed execution (Figure 1(B) or (C)); (ii)
provides degraded service in cases where full functionality is
not recoverable (Figure 1(D)); (iii) fails to recover, in which
case measures to stop safely may be taken (Figure 1(A) and
part of (D)).
masking
Normal
Fail-safe Fault
masking
Normal2Normal1Normal
Fault
Normal 1
Degraded
Fail-safe 2
Degraded
(B) (C)(A) (D)
Figure 1. Modes for fault tolerance.
V. OPERATION MODES FOR EVENT-B
The operation modes method is not intended to be used
as a modelling method on its own. The schematic nature of
the approach makes it it well suited to integration with an
existing formalism. In this section we discuss how modes
can be used with a well known formalism: Event-B. The
rules for deriving formal conditions for reasoning about a
combination modes and Event-B models are presented.
Event-B is a state-based formalism closely related to
Classical B [10] and Action Systems [11]. The step-wise
refinement approach is the corner stone of the Event-B
development method. The combination of model elaboration,
atomicity refinement and data refinement helps to formally
transition from high-level architectural models to very de-
tailed, executable specifications ready for code generation.
An extensive tool support through the Rodin Platform
makes Event-B especially attractive [12]. An integrated
Eclipse-based development environment is actively devel-
oped, well-supported, and open to third-party extensions in
the form of Eclipse plug-ins. The main verification technique
is theorem proving supported by a collection of powerful the-
orem provers. The development environment is also equipped
with model checking capabilities.
An Event-B model is defined by a tuple
(c, s, P, v, I, RI , E) where c and s are constants and
sets known in the model; v is a vector of model variables;
P (c, s) is a collection of axioms constraining c and s.
I is a model invariant limiting the possible states of v:
I(c, s, v). The combination of P and I should characterise
a non-empty collection of suitable constants, sets and
model states: ∃c, s, v ·P (c, s)∧ I(c, s, v). The purpose of an
invariant is to express model safety properties (that is, unsafe
states may not be reached). In Event-B an invariant is also
used to deduce model variable types. RI is an initialisation
action computing initial values for the model variables; it
is typically given in the form of a predicate constraining
next values of model variables without, however, referring
to previous values - RI(c, s, v′). Finally, E is a set of model
events. An event is a guarded command:
H(c, s, v)→ S(c, s, v, v′) (7)
where H(c, s, v) is an event guard and S(c, s, v, v′) is a
before-after predicate. An event may fire as soon as the
condition of its guard is satisfied. In case there is more
than one enabled event at a certain state, the demonic choice
semantics is applies. The result of an event execution is some
new model state v′. The semantics of an Event-B model
is usually given in the form of proof semantics, based on
Dijkstra’s work on weakest precondition [13]. A collection
of proof obligations is generated from the definition of the
model and these must be discharged in order to demonstrate
that the model is correct.
Putting it as a requirement that an enabled event produces a
new state v′ satisfying a model invariant, the following would
define the model consistency condition: whenever an event
on an initialisation action is attempted there exists a suitable
new state v′ such that a model invariant is maintained - I(v′).
This is usually stated as two separate proof obligations: a
feasibility obligation requiring the existence of (any) new
state v′ and the invariant satisfaction obligation showing
that any new state v′ maintains an invariant. The invariant
satisfaction obligation requires that a new state produced by
an event must satisfies a model invariant:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, v) ∧ S(c, s, v, v′)⇒ I(c, s, v′) (8)
An event must also be feasible: an appropriate new state
v′ must exist for some given current state v:
I(c, s, v) ∧ P (c, s) ∧H(c, s, v)⇒ ∃v′ · S(c, s, v, v′) (9)
Conceptually, operation modes and Event-B models are
related by requiring that every mode and mode transition has
a suitable implementation in an Event-B model. A mode is
related to a non-empty subset of Event-B model events and
mode transition is mapped into a single Event-B event:
A1/G1 → E1, . . . An/Gn → En
(i j) → Ep . . . (k l) → Eq (10)
Event sets E1, . . . , En may overlap but may not be iden-
tical. In the latter case they specify the same mode. The
mapping between transitions and events is one-to-many: a
transition is mapped into a non-empty set of events. Each
event associated with a transition must properly implement
the transition, that is, it must be proven it gets enabled
in a stated assumed by a source mode and establishes a
state corresponding to the assumption of a target mode. To
establish mapping, for some transition (i  j) → Ep it is
required to demonstrate the following:
∀e · (e ∈ Ep∧I(c, s, v)∧He(c, s, v)∧Se(c, s, v, v′)⇒ Ai(v)∧Aj(v′))
(11)
The composition of modes and Event-B clarifies how a
system evolves when it is in a mode, how mode switching is
done and the way system is initialised. The old internal rule
is changed to reflect the way a new system state is computed:
assuming that a system is mode Ai/Gi → Ei and the current
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state is valid (I(v) holds) and satisfies the mode assumption
(Ai holds) the next state is some state v′ such that mode
guarantee G(v, v′) holds along with before-after predicate
Re(v, v′) of one of enabled (He(v)) mode events (e ∈ Ei):
internal1
I(v) ∧Am(v) ∧Gm(v, v′) ∧Am(v′)
∃e · e ∈ Ei ∧He(v) ∧Re(v, v′)
〈m,w〉 → 〈m,w′〉
The above states that an execution cannot progress if none
of the events establishes a mode guarantee or there is no
enabled event. To ensure that in a given mode a system
evolves correctly, it is required to show for every mode event
that the event establishes mode guarantee and the event guard
is compatible with the mode assumption. Rules switching1 and
start1 are analogously obtained from rules switching and start
in Section II. The rule above gives a rise to a number of
conditions on Event-B. Firstly, all the events of a mode must
satisfy its guarantee provided the assumption holds:
I(v) ∧A(v) ∧H(v) ∧R(v, v′)⇒ G(v, v′) (12)
Also, the partitioning of the events into modes must be in
an agreement with the event guards. When event is enabled
then the assumption of its mode must hold. Since an event
is potentially associated with multiple modes, the disjunction
of all the relevant assumptions must hold:
H(v)⇒ A1(v) ∨ · · · ∨Ak(v)
Ak+1(v) ∨ · · · ∨An(v)⇒ ¬H(v) (13)
where A1, . . . , Ak are the assumptions of the modes con-
taining an event with guard H(v) and Ak+1, . . . , An are
those not containing the event.
It is required to show that a system is always able to
progress once it is in a given mode. For this, it must be
shown that there is always at least one enabled event among
the events of the mode:
I(v) ∧A(v)⇒ H1(v) ∨ · · · ∨Hn(v) (14)
Provided the three conditions above are discharged, it is
guaranteed that, once in a given mode, a system would
unfailingly progress in accordance with the mode conditions
for the system lifetime or until the system transitions into a
different mode.
a) Operation Modes and Event-B Co-refinement: The
Event-B development method offers a gradual, refinement-
based, model detailing. To refine model M one constructs a
new model M ′ such that for any valid state of M ′ there is a
corresponding state in M . In Event-B, this is accomplished
by discharging a number of refinement proof obligations
formulated for each model event. As refinement in Event-
B is monotonic, a model refinement could be constructed
by changing only a part of a model and demonstrating the
relevant conditions for just that part. Event-B refinement is a
combination of data, superposition, behavioural and atomicity
refinement. Atomicity refinement permits introduction of a
finer level of atomic steps needed to realise a given function-
ality. Event-B behavioural refinement allows a modeller to
replace an event guard and event before-after predicate. The
rules linking abstract and concrete guards and before-after
predicates are as follows. The guard of the concrete version
of an event must be stronger than its abstract counterpart:
P (s, c) ∧ I(s, c, v) ∧ J(s, c, v, u) ∧H(s, c, u)⇒ G(s, c, v) (15)
A new before-after predicate must be a stronger version of
its abstraction:
P (s, c) ∧ I(s, c, v) ∧ J(s, c, v, u) ∧H(s, c, u)∧
S(s, c, u, u′)⇒ v′ · (R(s, c, v, v′) ∧ J(s, c, v′, u′)) (16)
An event may be split into two or more events. In this
case, the refinement relation is proved for each new event in
the same manner for as for on-to-one event refinement. New
events may be introduced but may only update new variables.
Standard consistency conditions apply.
A composition of operation modes and Event-B models has
to be refined in such a manner that it obeys both operation
mode refinement and Event-B refinement. For rule 5, it is
required that a refined operation mode is made of events
refining events from an abstract mode and also each event
from the abstract mode is present as a copy or a refined
event in the refined mode.
A(v)/G(v, v′) → E 
 A′(u)/G′(u, u′) → E′,
iff





I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A′(u)
I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧G′(u, u′)⇒ G(v, v′)
∀e · e ∈ E′ ⇒ ∃a · a ∈ E ∧ e 
 a
∀e · e ∈ E ⇒ ∃a · a ∈ E′ ∧ a 
 e
(17)
Rule 6 for refinement of modes into a collection of new
modes is changed in a similar manner.
A(v)/G(v, v′) → E 
 A1(u)/G1(u, u
′) → E1
A2(u)/G2(u, u′) → E2 ,
iff





I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧A(v)⇒ A1(u) ∨A2(u)
I(v) ∧ J(v, u) ∧G1(u, u′) ∨G2(u, u′)⇒ G(v, v′)
∀e · e ∈ E1 ∪ E2 ⇒ ∃a · a ∈ E ∧ e 
 a
∀e · e ∈ E ⇒ ∃a · a ∈ E1 ∪ E2 ∧ a 
 e
(18)
Conditions 17 and 18 state how mode refinement is related
to Event-B refinement. They are the basis for generating
proof obligations that would determine the correspondence
between an Event-B model and a modes model.
b) Tool Support: The Rodin platform supports mod-
elling and reasoning with Event-B models. Extensions to the
Rodin platform can be integrated with: tool interface, mod-
elling process and verification infrastructure. An extension
providing the support for modelling with modes would let
a designer to visually construct a modes model and would
take care of generating the proof obligations required to
demonstrate the correspondence between the modes model
and the associated Event-B model. Proof obligations are
delegated to the proof infrastructure of the Platform that
passes them on to one or of automated theorem provers and
also an interactive prover should a theorem prover find a
problem or fail to discharge a proof obligation.
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VI. CRUISE CONTROL CASE STUDY
A simplified version of one of the DEPLOY case stud-
ies [14] developed in cooperation with industrial partners,
the case study illustrates the application of the proposed
technique to the development of a cruise control system.
The purpose of the system is to assist a driver in reaching
and maintaining a predefined speed. Due to the nature of
the system, attention is given to the interaction of a driver,
cruise control and the controlled parts of a car. In the current
modelling we assume an idealised car and idealised driving
conditions such that the car always responds to the commands
and the actual speed is updated according to the control
system commands. Figure 2 presents the diagrams with the
sequence of refinements.
(A)
ignitionOn ignitionOff
IGNITION CYCLE
(B)
CRUISE CONTROL
ignitionOn ignitionOff
DRIVER
IGNITION CYCLE
ccOn ccOff
setSt
(C)
MAINTAIN APPROACH
DRIVER
ccOff
setSt
sa=st setSt
IGNITION CYCLE
setSt
ccOnccOn
ignitionOn
CRUISE CONTROL
ignitionOff
(D)
LING
MAINTAIN APPROACH
DRIVE DRIVE
DEGRADEDNORMAL
ERROR
HAND-
ccOn
sa=st setSt
setSt
eoIEH
faultfault
eoREH
DRIVER
ccOnccOff
IGNITION CYCLE
ignitionOffignitionOn
fault
CRUISE CONTROL
setSt
Figure 2. Mode refinement sequence for the Cruise Control System.
(A) IGNITION CYCLE: Figure 2(A) presents the di-
agram of the most abstract model for the system. It is
composed only by the IGNITION CYCLE mode and represents
the activity from the instant the ignition is turned on, event
ignitionOn establishes the assumption for that mode, to
the instant it is turned off, event ignitionOff changes the
conditions of the system and falsify the assumptions for this
mode. The model includes: the state of ignition (on/off),
modelled by a boolean flag ig; the current speed of the car
(a modelling approximation of an actual car speed), stored
in variable sa; a safe speed limit speedLimit above which
the car should not be in any case; and a safe speed variation
maxSpeedV . No memory is retained about the states in the
previous ignition cycle. Initially, the current speed is zero
and ignition is off: sa ∈ 0 ∧ ig ∈ FALSE. Independently
of the operation of the car (by the driver or by the cruise
control) the following has to be ensured during an ignition
cycle (we present the intuition in the first line and a formal
representation of the assumptions and guarantees, based on
the variables introduced, in the second line).
mode assumption guarantee
IGNITION ignition is on keep speed under limit and
CYCLE (ac/de)celarate safely
ig = true (sa < speedLimit) ∧
( |sa′ − sa| < maxSpeedV )
(B) DRIVER and CRUISE CONTROL: When the ignition
is turned on, control is with the driver. While the ignition is
on, control can be passed from the driver to the cruise control
and back. It is assumed that a driver has two buttons on a
control panel: the on button switches on the cruise control;
the off button returns to the driving mode. A third input is
available to set the target speed to be achieved by the cruise
control. The system is naturally represented with two modes:
DRIVER corresponding to the activity when cruise control
is off and CRUISE CONTROL when cruise control is active.
The on/off buttons mentioned are mapped to transition events
ccOn and ccOff . The diagram in Figure 2(B) depicts the
two possible modes during an ignition cycle.
This refinement introduces: the state of cruise control
(on/off), modelled by boolean flag cc; the target speed that
a cruise control is to achieve and maintain, represented
by variable st; an allowance interval isp that determines
how much actual speed could deviate from a target speed
when cruise control tries to maintain a target speed. Initially,
the target speed is undefined and cruise control is off:
st ∈ N ∧ cc ∈ FALSE. The description of the modes:
mode assumption guarantee
DRIVER ignition cycle ignition cycle
assumptions and guarantees
cruise control off
ig = true ∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = false (|sa′ − sa| < maxSpeedV )
CRUISE ignition cycle ignition cycle guarantees
CONTROL assumptions and and maintain target speed or
cruise control on approach target speed
ig = true ∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = true (|sa′ − sa| < maxSpeedV )
∧( |sa′ − st′| ≤ isp ∨
|sa′ − st′| < |sa− st| )
(C) Refining the CRUISE CONTROL Mode: If the
difference between current (sa) and target (st) speeds is
within an acceptable error interval (isp), the cruise control
works to MAINTAIN the current speed. Otherwise, it employs
different procedures to APPROACH the target speed, charac-
terizing two modes refining CRUISE CONTROL. Respective
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assumptions and guarantees are described in the table below.
Figure 2(C) depicts these modes. Switching from DRIVER
to CRUISE CONTROL may either establish the assumptions
of APPROACH or MAINTAIN, depending on the difference
between st and sa. In either of these modes the cruise control
can be switched off and control returned to the driver.
mode assumption guarantee
APPROACH cruise control cruise control
assumptions and guarantees and
speed not close approach
to target target speed
ig = true ∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = true ∧ ( |sa′ − sa| <
|sa′ − st′| > isp maxSpeedV ) ∧
(|sa′ − st′| < |sa− st|)
MAINTAIN cruise control cruise control
assumptions and guarantees and
speed close maintain
to target target speed
ig = true ∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = true ∧ ( |sa′ − sa| <
|sa′ − st′| ≤ isp maxSpeedV ) ∧
(|sa′ − st′| ≤ isp)
(D) Error handling: at any time failures of the sur-
rounding components (e.g. airbag activated, low energy in
battery) may affect the cruise control system. These faults are
signaled as erroneous conditions and can be either reversible
or irreversible: the reversible errors result in the control
to be returned to the driver and handling measures to be
undertaken, so that the cruise control becomes available
again; the irreversible ones are handled but the cruise control
becomes unavailable during the ignition cycle.
mode assumption guarantee
DRIVE driver driver
NORMAL assumptions guarantees and
and no error cruise control available
ig = true∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = false∧ ( |sa′ − sa| <
error = false maxSpeedV )
ERROR driver driver guarantees and
HAND- assumptions cruise control not available
LING and error and and recovery measures
handling restore normal mode or
not finished swich to degraded mode
ig = true∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = false∧ ( |sa′ − sa| <
error = true∧ maxSpeedV )
eHand = true
DRIVE driver driver
DEGRA- assumptions guarantees and
DED and error and cruise control not available
handling finished
ig = true∧ (sa < speedLimit) ∧
cc = false∧ ( |sa′ − sa| <
error = true∧ maxSpeedV ) ∧
eHand = false
When an error is detected it is registered in an error
variable. We introduce a normal (DRIVE NORMAL), a de-
graded (DRIVE DEGRADED) and an error handling mode
(ERROR HANDLING). If an error is signaled in any of the
system modes, the system switches to ERROR HANDLING,
where control is with the driver. Eventually error handling
reestablishes DRIVE NORMAL, with full functionality avail-
able, or switches to DRIVE DEGRADED mode where the
cruise control is not available. This exemplifies situations (C)
and (D) of Figure 1. Figure 2(D) shows these modes. An
eHand variable registers that error handling is taking place.
The following table shows the assume/guarantee conditions
for the modes introduced. Note that although these modes
have same guarantees, they have different transition possibil-
ities. After error handling, the system continues in degraded
or normal mode. From error handling and degraded modes it
is not possible to turn the cruise control on.
VII. RELATED WORK
Several applications, structured in modes, can be found
in the literature. Papers [7] and [8] show how to formally
model and analyse modal space and avionic systems. In [15]
an Automated Highway System is extended to tolerate several
kinds of faults, modes are used to characterize degraded
operation. A classic case study on formal methods, the Steam
Boiler Control [16], is based on operation modes. More
recent examples on the use of modes for the specification of
airspace, transportation and automotive systems can be found
in [14]. Such contributions focus on specific applications and
not on general means to model and reason using modes.
In [17] the authors discuss characteristics of mode-driven
distributed applications and an infrastructure is proposed to
support mode-driven fault tolerance in run time. In [18], the
representation of degraded service outcomes and exceptional
modes of operation using UML use cases, activity diagrams
and state charts is discussed. Formal modelling and reasoning
is not discussed in these contributions.
In [6] a specification language for real-time systems, called
Modechart, is presented. In [19] the author discusses issues
related to mode changes and scheduling for hard real-time
systems. The general notion of modes in these papers is
analogous to the one discussed here, however their focus
is on the specification and analysis of timing properties of
systems. Functional properties are not discussed.
In the context of refinement based methods, the most
related work found is by Back and von Wright [20], where
guarantees (of an action system) are introduced to reason
about the parallel composition of action systems. Guarantees
of composed action systems have to mutually respect the
invariants. Since there is no notion of assumptions, the
flexibility of allowing different modes and mode switching,
is not offered.
Finally, Jones, Hayes and Jackson, in [21], discuss a
method that leads the designer to explicitly state rely condi-
tions (to be compared with assumptions) about the physical
world before deriving a first specification of the system. The
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notion of ’layer’ is briefly discussed. A layer is associated to
a set of rely/guarantee predicates and could be compared to
a mode. Different layers could be used to state the behaviour
under distinct conditions. Fault tolerance is briefly mentioned,
where one could have assumptions to characterise absence or
presence of faults.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper the notions of modes and mode refinement
are formally defined and their representations in a state-
base formalism (Event-B) are established. These notions
allow explicit characterization of various system conditions,
through expressing assumptions, and the properties of the
system working under such conditions, through the use of
guarantees. The complexity of design is reduced by structur-
ing systems using modes and by detailing this design using
refinement. This approach makes it easier for the developers
to map requirements to models and to trace requirements.
More specifically, the approach suits well for dealing with
fault-tolerance requirements: assumptions allow the explicit
mapping of the error coverage provided by the system,
whereas guarantees and mode switching configurations allow
the explicit mapping of requirements for different levels of
fault-tolerance.
In addition to developing a tool support, in the near future
we plan to investigate mode hierarchy (nesting), to express
recursive structuring for fault tolerance [22], mode concur-
rency, where further work is needed to support concurrent
modes acting on shared states, and state consistency during
distributed execution of modes.
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